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Abstract—The global SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is currently
putting a massive strain on the world’s critical infrastruc-
tures. With healthcare systems and internet service providers
already struggling to provide reliable service, some operators
may, intentionally or unintentionally, lever out privacy-protecting
measures to increase their system’s efficiency in fighting the
virus. Moreover, though it may seem all encouraging to see the
effectiveness of authoritarian states in battling the crisis, we,
the authors of this paper, would like to raise the community’s
awareness towards developing more effective means in battling
the crisis without the need to limit fundamental human rights. To
analyze the current situation, we are discussing and evaluating
the steps corporations and governments are taking to condemn
the virus by applying established privacy research.
Index Terms—COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2, pandemic, privacy,
security, critical infrastructure
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to its fast spreading throughout the world, the outbreak
of SARS-CoV-2 has become a global crisis putting stress on
the current infrastructure in some areas in unprecedented ways,
making shortcomings visible. Since there is no vaccination
against SARS-CoV-2, the only way to deal with the current
situation are non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI’s), to re-
ducing the number of new infections and flatten the curve of
total patients.
Having a look at European states like Italy, Spain, France,
or Austria which, are in lockdown as of March 2020, keeping
people away from seeing each other, their right to living a self-
determined life is not in their hands anymore. As shown by
Hatchett et al., this method showed a positive effect in St. Luis
during 1918’s influenza pandemic [1], Nevertheless, its long-
term effects on the economy and day-to-day life, including
psychological effects on people forced to self-isolate, are often
seen as a cause of concern [2]. Furthermore, some models
show the possibility of a massive rise of new infections after
the lockdown is ended [3].
Hence, to handle the situation, measures are being dis-
cussed, some of which may invade a citizen’s privacy. We
can see an example of this approach in Asian countries e.g.,
South Korea [4] and Singapore [5] where, besides extensive
testing, methods such as tracing mobile phone location data
in order to identify possible contact with infected persons [6].
Other countries have taken similar measures. For instance,
Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister, ordered Shin Bet, Israel’s
internal security service, to start surveilling citizens’ cell-
phones [7], [8], [9]. Persons who have been closer than two
meters to an infected person are receiving text messages telling
them to go into immediate home isolation for 14 days. As Shin
Bet mandate is to observe and fight middle easter terrorism,
naturally, Israel’s citizens are now concerned that it is now
helping in a medical situation [7], [8], [9]. Within the EU,
in particular, in Germany and Austria, telecommunications
providers are already providing health organizations and the
government with anonymous data of mobile phone location
data [10].
Although nobody has evaluated the effectiveness of these
measures, they raise concerns from privacy experts as the
massive collection of data can easily lead to harming the
population and violating their human rights if the collected
data is misused. In this paper, we discuss the privacy issues
that can arise in times of crisis and take a closer look into the
case of the German Robert Koch Institute receiving data from
Telekom. We conclude by providing some recommendations
about ways to minimize privacy harms while combating the
pandemic.
II. PRIVACY
In this section we outline the general definitions of privacy,
including describing the contextual integrity framework for
reasoning about privacy, and discuss privacy harms that can
occur from misuse of personal data. We furthermore discuss
the issues with privacy that can occur during a crisis such
as this global pandemic and what can be done to ensure
information security and hence appropriate data protection.
A. Definitions of Privacy
Privacy is a broad concept which has been studied from the
point of view of different disciplines, including social sciences
and humanities, legal studies and computer science. The
definitions of privacy are commonly centered around seeing
privacy as confidentiality (preventing disclosure of informa-
tion), control (providing people with means to control how
their personal data is collected and used) and transparency
(ensuring that users are aware of how their data is collected
and used, as well as ensuring that the data collection and
processing occurs in a lawful manner) [11].
Hannah Arendt, a Jewish philosopher who grew up in
Germany in the beginning of the 20th century defined privacy
within the context of public and private space. Her claim
was that if there exists public space, there is also private
space. Arendt considers the privacy concept as a distinction
between things that should be shown and things that should
be hidden [12]. And that, private spaces exist in opposition to
public spaces. Meaning, while the public square is dedicated
to appearances, the private space is devoted to the opposite,
namely hiding and privacy. She associated privacy with the
home. Due to the fact that we have become used to a ”digital
private space”, such as our own email inbox or personal data
on the phone, people are concerned and offended when the
private, hidden space is violated. However, in times of crisis
the term hidden or privacy becomes a new meaning.
Helen Nissenbaum, a Professor of Information Science,
proposed the concept of contextual integrity as a framework
to reason about privacy. According to her framework, privacy
is defined as adhering to the norms of information flow
[13]. These norms are highly contextual: for example, it is
appropriate for doctors to have access to the medical data
of their patients, but in most cases it is inappropriate for
employers to have access to medical data of their workers. Nis-
senbaum distinguishes between the following five principles of
information flow [14]: the sender, the subject, the receiver, the
information type and the transmission principle (e.g. whether
confidentiality has to be preserved, whether the data exchange
is reciprocal or whether consent is necessary and/or sufficient
for the appropriateness of the data exchange). The norms
governing these parameters are furthermore evaluated against
a specific context, including whether the information flow is
necessary for achieving the purpose of the context.
B. Privacy Harms
Data misuse can lead to different kinds of harms that
jeopardise physical and psychological well-being of people
as well as the overall society (see e.g. Solove, 2008). One of
them is persecution by the government – this might not be a
big concern in democratic societies, but democratic societies
can move into more authoritarian governance styles, especially
is crisis situations. Even if this does not happen, there are
other harms, e.g. a so called ”chilling effect”, where people
are afraid to speak up against the accepted norms when they
feel that they are being watched. Furthermore, harms can
result from data leaks, like unintentional errors or cyberattacks.
In these cases, information about individuals may become
known to unintended targets. This can result in physical
harm, stalking and damage of the data subject’s personal
relationships. Knowledge about one’s medical data can lead
to job discrimination. Leaked details about one’s lifestyle can
lead to raised insurance rates. Leakage of location data, in
particular, can reveal a lot of sensitive information about an
individual, such as the places they visit, which might in turn
result in dramatic effects when revealed. Just think of closeted
homosexuals visiting a gay clubs or marginalized religious
minorities visiting their place of worship. Even beyond these
concerns, access to large amounts of personal data can be
used for more effective opinion and behavior manipulation, as
evidenced by the Cambridge Analytica scandal [15].
In summary, absence of privacy has a dramatic effect on
our freedom of expression as individuals and on the well-
functioning of the society as a whole. It is therefore important
to ensure that the damage to privacy is minimized even in
times of crisis.
C. Privacy in Times of Crisis
When we are considering the example of doctors treating
their patients, we can use the framework of contextual integrity
to reason about the appropriate information flow as follows:
the patient is both the sender and the subject of the data
exchange, the doctor is the receiver, the information type is
the patient’s medical information, the transmission principle
includes, most importantly, doctor-patient confidentiality aside
from public health issues. The overall context is health care,
and the purpose of the context is both healing the patient
and protecting health of the population. It can therefore be
argued that in case of a global pandemic, one should allow
the exchange of patient’s data, especially when it comes to
data about infected patients and their contacts, to the extent
that it is necessary to manage the pandemic.
There is, however, a danger of misusing the collected data
outside of the defined context – the so-called ”mission creep”,
which experts argue was the case with NSA collecting data
from both US and foreign citizens on an unprecedented scale
as an aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack [16]. Furthermore,
aside from the danger of collecting data by the government, the
crisis situation leads to increase of data collection by private
companies, as people all over the world switch to remote
communication and remote collaboration tools from face-
to-face communications. The data collection and processing
practices of these tools, however, are often obscure from their
users: as known from research in related fields, privacy policies
are often too long, obscure, and complicated to figure out, and
shorter notices such as cookie disclaimers tend to be perceived
as too vague and not providing useful information [17], [18].
This leads to users often ignoring the privacy policies and
disclaimers, hence, being unaware of important information
about their data sharing. Moreover, even among the privacy-
concerned users, the adoption of more privacy-friendly tools
can be hindered by social pressure and network effects, if
everyone else prefers to use more popular tools that are less
inclined to protect the privacy of their users (as seen in
studies on security and privacy adoption in other domains, see
e.g. [19], [20]). This data collection even furthers the effects
of the so-called surveillance capitalism [21], which leads to
corporations having even more power over people than before
the crisis. This access to personal data by corporations is
furthermore aggravated by an increased usage of social media
platforms, increases in users sharing their location data and
giving applications increased access to their phone’s operating
system. Lowered barriers and increased online activity that
can be directly linked to an individual or an email address
is a treasure trove for for-profit corporations that monetize
consumer data. Many corporations are now getting free or low
cost leads for months to come.
A question that is often open for discussion is to which
extent people themselves would be ready to share their data,
even if it results in a privacy loss. As such, data sharing
habits in general have been the topic of research, leading to
discussions on so-called privacy paradox: people claiming that
privacy is important to them, yet not behaving in a privacy-
preserving way. The privacy paradox can be explained by
different factors [22]. One of them is the lack of awareness
about the extent of data collection as well as about the possible
harms that can result from unrestricted data sharing. A further
factor stems from decision biases, such as people’s tendency
to underestimate the risks that may happen in the future com-
pared against immediate benefit. Another noteworthy factor
are the manipulations by service providers (so-called dark
patterns) nudging users into sharing more of their data contrary
to their actual preferences. But rational decisions in times
of crisis are even more difficult. Given the state of stress
and anxiety many are in, people might be more likely to
accept privacy-problematic practices if they are told that these
practices are absolutely necessary for managing the crisis –
even if this is not actually the case.
The problem that people are more likely to surrender their
privacy rights if they have already had to surrender other
fundamental rights (such as freedom of movement due to
lockdown restrictions) is reminiscent of the psychological
mechanism of door-in-the-face technique. The door-in-the-face
technique is a method of social influence, where we ask a
person at first to do something that requires more than they
would accept. Afterward, we ask for a second smaller favor.
Research has shown that the person is now more likely to
accept the other smaller favor [23]. In the case of the SARS-
CoV-2 pandemic, governments first asked their citizens to
self-isolate ( limiting significant fundamental freedom) before
following up with the smaller favor of handing over some
private data to fight the outbreak. However, according to
Cantarero et al., the level of acceptance differs from individual
to individual [24], which makes it even more critical to rising
consciousness in population.
At the same time, timely access to data voluntarily shared
by people (in addition to the data collected by hospitals and
authorities) can indeed help combat the epidemics. In this, we
are supporting informed consent of data subjects, because it
ensures that people will only share data with institutions that
kept their data safe against privacy harms.
D. Information Security Concerns
In an increasingly digital world, establishing proper infor-
mation security safeguards is critical in preventing data leaks,
and hence, in preserving the privacy of data subjects. However,
the situation of such a global pandemic places significant
challenges on established workflows, information technology,
and security as well, resulting in various issues.
These problems arose when people stopped traveling, going
into the office, and started working from home. While some
companies and institutions have provided a possibility for
remote work also before the crisis, or are at least infrastruc-
turally and organizationally prepared, many are unprepared
for such a dramatic increase of home office work. They face
significant technical and organizational challenges, such as
ensuring the security of their systems given the need for
opening the network to remote access, e.g., via the so-called
demilitarized zone (DMZ), or perimeter control, an extension
of technical monitoring of the system and overall extension of
system hardening is ”hostile” (home) environments. A recent
poll revealed that the security teams of 47% of companies did
not have ”emergency plans in place to shift an on-premise
workforce to one that is remote” [25]. Even worse, these
challenges are more present in regulated (and therefore often
critical) industries as Sumir Karayi, CEO and founder of 1E,
in a Threatpost interview states:
“Government, legal, insurance, banking and healthcare are
all great examples of industries that are not prepared for
this massive influx of remote workers [...] Many companies
and organizations in these industries are working on legacy
systems and are using software that is not patched. Not only
does this mean remote work is a security concern, but it makes
working a negative, unproductive experience for the employee.
[...] Regulated industries pose a significant challenge because
they use systems, devices or people not yet approved for
remote work [...] Proprietary or specific software is usually
also legacy software. It’s hard to patch and maintain, and rarely
able to be accessed remotely.” [26]
In consequence, the urgent need to enable remote collabo-
ration related to the lack of preparation and preparation time
may lead to hurried and immature remote work strategies.
At the same time, ensuring proper security behavior of
the employees – something that was a challenge in many
companies also before the crisis – is becoming an even
more difficult task. We can currently see employees trying
to circumvent corporate restrictions by sending or sharing
data and documents over private accounts (shadow IT). Addi-
tionally, there is a surge of social engineering attacks among
other phishing email campaigns, business email compromise,
malware, and ransomware strains, as Sherrod DeGrippo, senior
director of threat research and detection at Proofpoint, states
[27].
Similar findings are provided by Atlas VPN research, which
shows that several industries broadly use unpatched or no
longer supported hardware or software systems, including the
healthcare sector [28].
Together with immature remote strategies, information secu-
rity and privacy risks may significantly increase and undermine
the standardized risk management process.
E. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Context of
the Pandemic
The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) has formu-
lated a statement on the processing of personal data in the
context of the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak [29].
According to EDPB, data protection rules do not hinder
measures taken in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic.
Even so, the EDPB underlines that, even in these exceptional
times, the data controller and processor must ensure the
protection of the personal data of the data subjects.
Therefore, several considerations should be taken into ac-
count to guarantee the lawful processing of personal data, and
in this context, one must respect the general principles of law.
As such, the GDPR allows competent public health authorities
like hospitals and laboratories as well as employers to process
personal data in the context of an epidemic, by national law
and within the conditions set therein.
Concerning the processing of telecommunication data, such
as location data, the national laws implementing the ePri-
vacy Directive must also be respected. The national laws
implementing the ePrivacy Directive provide that the location
data can only be used by the operator when they are made
anonymous, or with the consent of the individuals. If it is
not possible to only process anonymous data, Art. 15 of the
ePrivacy Directive enables the member states to introduce
legislative measures pursuing national security and public
security.
This emergency legislation is possible under the condition
that it constitutes a necessary, appropriate, and proportionate
measure within a democratic society. If a member state intro-
duces such measures, it is obliged to put in place adequate
safeguards, such as granting individuals the right to a judicial
remedy.
III. ROBERT KOCH INSTITUTE AND TELEKOM CASE
In this section, we conduct a preliminary analysis of German
disease control receiving movement data from a telecommu-
nication provider.
In Germany, the authority for disease control and preven-
tion, the Robert Koch Institute (RKI), made headlines on
March 18, 2020, as it became public that telecommunication
provider Telekom had shared an anonymized set of mobile
phone movement data to monitor citizens’ mobility in the
fight against SARS-CoV-2. In total, Telekom sent 46 million
customer’s data to the RKI for further analysis. The German
Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of In-
formation, Ulrich Kelber, overseeing the transfer, commented
on the incident that he is not concerned about violating any
data protection rules, as the data had been anonymized upfront
[30].
However, researchers have shown that seemly anonymized
data sets can indeed be ”deanonymized” [31]. Constanze Kurz,
an activist, and expert on the subject matter, commented that
she was skeptical about the anonymization. She urged Telekom
to publicize the anonymization methods that were being used
and asked the Robert Koch Institute to explain how it will
protect this data for unauthorized third-party access. Several
research studies had shown the deanonymization for data sets
to extract personal information, including a case from 2016,
when a journalist and a data scientist acquired an anonymized
dataset with the browsing habits of more than three million
German citizens [32], [33].
As at the moment, it is hard to tell whether disclosure
of personal data is possible from the shared set (even more
so given the development of new re-identification methods,
including possible future development), we look at the worst-
case scenario, namely, that personal data is deanonymize-
able. Given this scenario, we use Nissenbaum’s contextual
integrity thesis to understand if privacy Telekom has violated
its customer’s privacy [14]. We do so by stating the context of
the case, the norm – what everyone expects should happen –
plus five contextual parameters to further analyze the situation.
Table I summarizes the contextual integrity framework as
applied to the German data sharing situation.
Table I
NISSENBAUM’S CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY APPLIED TO THE ROBERT KOCH
INSTITUTE AND TELEKOM CASE.
Parameters Contextual information
Context Health care, including public health
Norm
The Robert Koch Institute is responsible to pre-
vent the spread of disease in Germany and is
currently fighting further spread of SARS-CoV-
2
Data Subjects 46 million customers of German Telekom
Sender German Telekom or subsidiary Motionlogic
Recipient The Robert Koch Institute
Information type Mobile phone movement data
Transmission
principle
Sender and Recipient are working with the Ger-
man Federal Commissioner for Data Protection
and Freedom of Information to ensure that the
shared data was anonymized and is only used to
prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in Germany
A principle that is perhaps most interesting for further
elaboration is the transmission principle. Given the context
and urgency of the situation, one might agree that having
the German Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and
Freedom of Information oversee the transaction and taking
some measures to anonymize the data set appropriately serves
as a practical solution towards limiting the spread of SARS-
CoV-2, also without explicitly obtaining consent from data
subjects. We do, however, assume that appropriate use of data
would be limiting it to a specific purpose of combating the
pandemic, and not reusing it to other purposes without further
assessment. Note, however, that there is space for discussion,
in which the community should be engaged, about the norms
that apply in this situation, especially given the extraordinary
situation and the severity of the crisis.
A further step of the contextual integrity is, however, also
part of the contextual integrity framework to Nissenbaum’s
five parameter thesis of contextual information to create
hypothetical scenarios that could threaten the decision’s
future integrity. We, therefore, consider the following
hypotheticals, which we believe would violate contextual
integrity:
Hypothetical scenario 1: ”The Robert Koch Institute
does not delete the data after SARS-CoV-2 crisis”
Hypothetical scenario 2: ”The Robert Koch Institute
forwards data to other state organs or to third parties”
Hypothetical scenario 3: ”The Robert Koch Institute
uses data for other purposes different from fighting SARS-
CoV-2 spread or other similar public health crises”
These hypothetical scenarios would violate the transmission
principle that the data is only going to be used to handle
the crisis (and, in the second hypothetical, also the receiver
of the data). We believe a future assessment is necessary
to determine if the data transfer was indeed necessary to
fight the pandemic. Alternatively, if alternatively, customer
permissions should have been required upfront.
Hypothetical scenario 4: ”The Robert Koch Institute
requests data about phone calls and text messages exchanged
by Telekoms’ customers
Hypothetical scenario 5: ”The Robert Koch Institute
requests data about Telekom customer movements from the
last ten years
These scenarios change the type of information. We
want to argue that the new exchanged data no longer serves
the purpose of fighting the pandemic. This point was also
made by the Electronic Freedom Frontier organization
[34], noting that since the incubation period of the virus is
estimated to last 14 days, getting access to data that is much
older than that would be a privacy violation. We think that,
similar to the first three scenarios, a further assessment, based
on transparent information, is necessary.
Hypothetical 6: ”The Robert Koch Institute uses the
data purely for fighting SARS-CoV-2, but fails to keep it
secure against hackers.”
As with the first three scenarios, the transmission principle
of confidentiality is violated in this scenario, albeit
unintentionally, and, in case of improper anonymization,
personal information might still leak. Hence, a privacy
violation has taken place. Referring to outlined information
security concerns, an increase in cyber attacks related to
improper information security management in a time of crisis
significantly increases the risk. Given the above-outlined
hypotheticals, we recommend implementing appropriate
protection measures.T
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND OUTLOOK
Countries around the world have already taken numerous
initiatives to slow down the spread of the SARS-CoV-2, such
as remote working, telemedicine, and online learning and
shopping. That has required a legion of changes in our lives.
However, as mentioned in previous sections, these activities
come with associated security and privacy risks. Various
organizations are raising concerns regarding these risks (see
e.g., the statement and proposed principles from the Electronic
Freedom Frontier [34].
Of particular interest is the case of healthcare systems,
which must be transparent with the information related to
patients, but cautious with the disclosed information. Equally,
hospitals might also decide to withhold information in order
to try to minimize liability. That is a slippery slope: both cases
– no information or too much information – might lead to a
state of fear in the population and a false sense of security
(i.e., no information means there is no problem) or a loss of
privacy when we decide to disclose too much information.
In the current situation and others that might arise, princi-
ples, and best practices developed before the crisis are still
applicable, namely, privacy by design principles, and most
importantly, data minimization. Only strictly necessary data
needed to manage the crisis should be collected and deleted
once humanity has overcome the crisis.
In this context, patient data should be collected, stored, ana-
lyzed, and processed under strict data protection rules (such as
the General Data Protection Regulation GDPR) by competent
public health authorities, as mentioned in the previous chapter
[29]. An example of addressing the issues of data protection
during the crisis can also be seen within the Austrian project
VKT-GOEPL [35]. It was the project’s goal to generate a
dynamic situational map for ministries overseeing the crisis.
Events, such as terrorist attacks, flooding, fire, and pandemic
scenarios, were selected. Already ten years ago, the need for
geographical movement data provided by telecommunication
providers was treated as a use-case. Furthermore, the project
initiators prohibited the linking of personal data from different
databases in cases where this data was not anonymized. They
recommended that ministries are transparently informing all
individuals about the policies which apply to the processing
of their data.
Regarding data analysis, we recommend that citizens only
disclose their data to authorized parties, once these are putting
adequate security measures and confidentiality policies in
place. Moreover, only data that is strictly necessary should
be shared. We think that proper data storage should make
use of advanced technology such as cryptography. Patient
data – including personal information such as contact data,
sexual preferences or religion amongst others – should not
be revealed. As anonymizing data has been shown to be
a non-trivial task that is hard to achieve in a proper way,
advanced solutions such as cryptographic techniques for secure
multiparty computation or differential privacy algorithms for
privacy-preserving data releases should be used.
Besides, to ensure privacy from the collection stage, con-
sistent training of the medical personnel, volunteers, and ad-
ministrative staff should be done. The current lack of training
(due to limited resources, shortage of specialists, and general
time pressure) leads to human errors and neglect of proper
security and privacy protection measures.
A further concern, which we did not investigate in this
paper is to ensure fairness when it comes to algorithmic
decision making. As such, automated data systems (”big data”
or ”machine learning”) are known to have issues with bias-
based e.g., on race or gender that can lead to discrimination
[36]. In order to prevent such adverse effects during the crisis,
these systems should furthermore be limited in order to limit
bias based on nationality, sexual preferences, religion, or other
factors that are not related to handling the pandemic.
Finally, we recognize that having access to timely and ac-
curate data can play a critical role in combating the epidemic.
Nevertheless, as discussed in previous sections, ignoring issues
around the collection and handling of personal data might
cause serious harm that will be hard to repair in the long run.
Therefore, as big corporations and nation-states are collecting
data from the world’s population; it is of crucial importance
that this data is handled responsibly and keeping the privacy
of the data subjects in mind.
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